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Communists, Agrarians, Democrats, and republicans. In the summer the Soviet Union, against whom Bulgaria had not declared war, began to press for the ousting of the Germans and a reversal of the policy pursued since 1941. On September 2, a new Bulgarian government, headed by a former secretary of Stambolisky, Konstantin Muraviev, and including former Premier Mušanov, announced the full restoration of democratic freedom and rights, a return to neutrality, and the nullification of the Tripartite Pact. It also dispatched representatives to Cairo to negotiate an armistice with Great Britain and the United States and, on September 8, declared war on Germany. In the meantime, however, Russia, not fully satisfied with the course being pursued, declared war on Bulgaria on September 5. This confusing situation was clarified four days later when Muraviev was succeeded by a new government which had the full support of the "Fatherland Front." It was led by Kimon Georgiev, who was alleged to have experienced a change of heart since his participation in the *coup d'état* of 1934, and included his former colleague, Colonel Velchev.

Before the end of September Russian military forces had moved into the country and were rapidly turning the Bulgarian army, now placed under the command of a Russian General, Tolbukhin, against the fleeing Germans. By the formal armistice terms, signed in Moscow on October 28, 1944, Bulgaria promised to withdraw from all territories occupied in Greece and Yugoslavia, to restore all properties of the United Nations and make reparation for damages, to rid Bulgaria of all pro-Axis organizations, to coöperate in the arrest and trial of war criminals, and to accept an Allied Control Commission which would regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice. Since Russia held a dominant position in the Commission and since Bulgaria was prepared to follow Communist leadership, her lot as an ex-Axis satellite differed little from that of Yugoslavia.

### *Reconstruction and Peacemaking*

Reconstruction in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria took the form of a revolution led by Communists and was patterned after the policies and practices of the Soviet Union.

#### *The National Front in Yugoslavia*

The Tito government, established in Yugoslavia in 1945, promised that it would "comply with the fundamental and general principles of constitutional government" and that it intended to found a democratic, federative state. This was to consist of Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Provisional governments were formed in each of these units in April and May, 1945. While Tito's ter-

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side of the East-West division that seems to have split Europe and the world.

With respect to boundary settlements, Yugoslavia failed to get Trieste and an additional slice of Carinthia, although she won most of the Istrian Peninsula and much of Venezia Giulia which she had demanded. At the same time Bulgaria retained the part of southern Dobruja awarded her in 1941, but failed to get an outlet to the sea through "Aegean Macedonia" as she desired. Although both governments, along with Albania's, were guilty of permitting, if not fostering, attacks upon Greece by armed bands in support of Greek Communists and refused to coöperate fully with the United Nations investigating committee, it is not yet clear whether they hoped to wrest part of Macedonia from Greece by force or looked forward to a secession by a Communist group which would join the Yugoslav federation.

It is certain, however, that Bulgaria's relations with Yugoslavia were conducted in the spirit of the declaration of January 10, 1945 in favor of "the closest possible collaboration with the peoples of the new Yugoslavia." Tito more than once reciprocated this sentiment, raising the conjecture that perhaps the federal structure of Yugoslavia might be extended to embrace Bulgaria. Until August, 1947, however, collaboration took the form of an agreement, completed on August 2, upon a mutual assistance pact and full cultural and economic coöperation, described in the announcement as virtually wiping out the frontier between them. At the same time Yugoslavia made a series of agreements with Albania that integrated its economy closely with Yugoslavia's. Thus the century-old dream of Balkan Slavic leaders came close to realization by means of the binding force of Communism. In this and in many other respects Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are experiencing a revolution still at full tide. What the ultimate ebb and flow may bring still remains obscured by the uncertainties and imponderables not only within their boundaries, but perhaps even more by those in the world around them.

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8. Bojkoff K-4,5 (no date) 1946 FE1 Bulgaria EE1



for new wars. Nevertheless, Bulgaria obtained an outlet on the Aegean Sea and this was recognized as a reasonable act by all Balkan peoples (1913).

The events in Europe that brought about the First World War found Bulgaria on the side of Germany. The violation of essential Bulgarian rights after the Balkan wars and the outrage exercised by the former allies (1912) of Bulgaria over the Bulgarian population, left under the foreign domination, had much to do in leading Bulgaria to take this fatal decision, which was absolutely opposed to the highest interests of the Bulgarian nation. The Carnegie Foundation made an investigation (1914) to establish the truth about cruelties practiced by both sides over the peaceful population and their abuse of the international rules for carrying on war. We may safely say that Bulgaria came out with honor as a result of this investigation, while the same could not be said about the Greek army, as we will point out this further in our study.

The World War of 1914-1918 ended for Bulgaria with the Treaty of Neuilly. Bulgaria was punished in an unprecedented manner. The biggest punishment, however, was depriving her from the outlet on the Aegean Sea, which all Balkan peoples unanimously recognized as her reasonable right in spite of their inimical attitude.

**26. The Peace Treaty of Neuilly, 1919.**

If we consider the Peace Treaty of Berlin as a fatal step for the peace in Europe, then the Treaty of Versailles - Neuilly was the unpardonable repetition of the same fault for the Balkans. It was a peace arrangement fostered by statesmen who were blinded by revenge. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Balfour, Sonino and Orlando were the authors of a peace of „politicians". Dillon[1]) speaks of them as follows: „They were novices in international affairs. Geography, ethnology, psychology and political history were forbidden books for them. What they lacked might have been supplied, to a large degree, by a selection of counsellors more widely informed than they. They chose, however, the help of mediocrities. Since the heads of the main governments, by implication, pretended to be the authorized representatives of the human

[1]) Dillon, The Peace Conference; cif. H. G. Wells, opus cit. vol. III, p. 1114.

March 3,1918, and reiterated by a communist deputy on May 25,1932. Ferdinand did not sign the mobilisation order until the money was advanced to him.[1]

The Powers to whom the existence of the Balkan Alliance had become known, made a belated attempt to impose the acceptance of reforms on Turkey in order to avoid the threatened war, and even Sazonov, at the instigation of France ,did his best to restrain the combative mood of the Balkan States which he had encouraged, but an Albanian revolt, and a massacre of Bulgarians in the Macedonian town of Kotsana, followed by tbe massihg of Turki h troops in ,Thrace, forced the hands of the Balkan States, which replied by hurriedly mobilising their armies. On October 8, Montenegro declared war on Turkey, the Porte followed by declaring war on Serbia and Bulgaria on the 17th, and finally Greece declared war on Turkey on the 18th. The Bulgarian victories in Thrace were not utilised to the full owing to tne mutual jealousies of the commanding generals. General Kutintchev, the commander of the first army refused to lend his support to the third army under General Radko Dimitriev at Lule Burgas because he had been frustrated in his hopes that both the first and third army

[1] A few years ago a Communist interpellated the German government in the Reichstag as to the disbursements which were being made to Ferdinand, and it was then revealed that this modern Judas had received thirty million marks in order to involve Bulgaria in the world war on the side of the Central Powers, and that moreover he was drawing a yearly allowance. In a resounding interview published in the Austro-German press immediately after his abdication, Ferdinand had boasted that for thirty years he had faithfully served the interests of the Central Empires so that there is nothing untoward if the Germans are now granting him a pension.

Madol in his "Ferdinand of Bulgaria" p. 233 attempts to dispel the depressing impression caused by these revelations of the contemptible behaviour of his patron by offering what could only be a very lame apology.

721 would have been placed under his command. After the fall of Kirk-Kilisse, General R. Dimitriev was prevented from pursuing the retreating enemy, and instead was ordered by Head Quarters to stop and entrench. This permitted the Turks to make a further stand at Visa and Lule Burgas. After defeating them at the latter place he was again prevented from following them up and ordered to entrench in spite of his assurances that the Turks were in full flight. The Turks themselves admit that had the Bulgarians followed up their success at Kirk-Kilisse they would have reached Constantinople before them. (Cf. Sherif Pasha's „Quelques reflections sur la Guerre." p. 28) Bulgarian Head Quarters could not forgive General R. Dimitriev his brilliant victories. (Cf. V, T. Veltchev's „Towards the Pogrom").

128 The Turks had been so cowed by their defeats that their ambassador in St. Petersburgh demanded on October 22, Russia's mediation in order that the Bulgarians might not enter Constantinople. The Ministerial Council received on October 29 from the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha an offer for the conclusion of an armisrice and preliminary peace, approved of it and transmitted it to Ferdinand who replied only on November 1, forbidding them to transmit it to the allies of Bulgaria, and only allowed this offer to be communicated to them after ordering the attack on the Tchataldja lines. The megalomania of Ferdinand may be gauged by the text of his reply: „Deeply grieved by the Grand Vizier soliciting peace, I, as leader of the victorious and indomitable Bulgarian armies encamped under the walls of Constantinople in the name and for the honour of our country forbid the government to communicate the Turkish offer to our Allies. No steps to be taken until I consult with the leaders of the army . . . no one can oppose the desire of a 300,000 army". The Bulgarian staff however, was able to restrain to some

648 Russia if he felt himself unsupported, and Sazonov readily sensed this when he replied on June 25 to Bobtchev, the Bulgarian Minister in St. Petersburgh:

„You are following Austria's counsels, you are free... The Emperor did not expect an ultimatum as to a time limit in his decision in the dispute. After your declaration, expect nothing from us, forget that some responsibility may devolve on us through the Treaty of 1902".

In fact Russia had clearly intimated to Bulgaria as late as June 24, that she would not arbitrate in the Bulgaro-Serbian dispute so long as Bulgaria refused to submit to arbitration her difference with Greece (Russian Orange Book, document No. 251). Danev as late as June 28 wired to Bobtchev: „I shall negotiate alone if I come. Please do not talk of any arbitration concerning Greece." This shows that Danev had never accepted Russia's conditions and that he was playing for time. In fact the Bulgarian Cabinet had agreed on June 22 that it would accept Russian arbitration provided the Tsar agreed to issue his verdict by June 29, and within the stipulations of the Bulgaro-Serbian Treaty, and these conditions Russia declined to comply with, so that Gueshov's contention that Bulgaria had accepted the arbitration of the Tsar of Russia can not be upheld. Events would certainly have taken another turn if the arbitrator had been a more energetic person that the late Tsar Nicolas II and if he had interceded firmly and not allowed the quarrel to drag on and become envenomed.

648 721 In a public lecture delivered in Sofia on April 23, 1933, General Kovatchev, the commander of the 4th Bulgarian army, which attacked the Serbians on June 29, 1913, gave some striking details which illustrate the morbid ambition which haunted Ferdinand concerning Constantinople, his abnormal treatment of his subordinates, and a narrative of the events which led to the issuing of the

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fatal order to attack. Though his version does not agree in all particulars with others, General Kovatchev also concluded that Danev was bound to know of what was brewing. The lecture may be summarised as follows:

The General began by narrating how Ferdinand attempted to excite the anger of the officer corps against Russia, presenting the latter as the sole obstacle to Bulgaria's securing an outlet on the sea of Marmara. In an interview which Kovatchev had on February 8, 1913, Ferdinand complained to him of Generals Savov, Nikiforov and Fitchev and made most disparaging remarks about them. At a Cabinet meeting held after the Easter holidays, all the army commanders save Fitchev expressed the opinion that the Bulgarian army was in a position to wage war on Serbia and Greece, and that while Gueshov's partisans were for a peaceful solution, Danev's supporters were warlike. General Savov related to the speaker that the conflict which arose between him and Tsar Ferdinand was due to the latter's resolve not to end the war without securing Rodosto on the Marmara. Ferdinand ordered him on April 8 to write to the Prime Minister, Gueshov, in the name of the army, that it refused to conclude peace until the above object had been attained. Savov answered that he could not agree to this demand and expose the army's prestige needlessly. Ferdinand reiterated his demand which Savov again categorically rejected, whereupon Ferdinand convoked him in his presence and began reprobating him for his insubordination reviling him and accusing him of ingratitude, since he had taken him out of the dock and placed him in this high post, and instead of showing gratitude, he was discrediting him in the eyes of the army. This flow of invective put Savov out of humour and he coolly replied that when he would be tried he would not hesitate to unravel matters which would clearly reveal who of the two was responsible for the misdeeds which were being ascribed to him, after which Savov bowed and withdrew. Kovatsev met Savov again on May 31 and was told that the army was now being moved to the west in order to impress Russia, France and England into coercing Serbia to accept the Treaty stipulations, as these three Powers were most anxious to maintain the Balkan Alliance. Concerning the issuing of the order to attack, General Kovatsev affirms that both Ferdinand and Savov did not want to provoke war, but that they were seeking to impress not only the Serbians and Greeks, but also the Tsar of Russia, in order that the latter might arbitrate in favour of Bulgaria. Savov had not informed Danev of the intended attack, but he supposed that

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Tsar Ferdinand had done so. Savov could hardly assume that the two had not acted in concert, for Danev was kept imformed of matters of even a more delicate nature, so that he could not be ignorant of what was happening, since Palace circles were cognisant, and they would have reported it to him. Another proof that Danev was acquainted with what was occurring, was the telegrams which he addressed on the morning of June 30 to the Bulgarian representatives abroad to the effect that the attack had been started by the Serbians and Greeks and not by the Bulgarians, and secondly the order Danev transmitted simultaneously to the military censors to prevent the publication of any news concerning what was happening at the front.

When the attack miscarried, the Cabinet attempted to disculpate itself by showing that it knew nothing of the attack. After consulting with the Russian Minister in Sofia, it ordered the suspension of hostilities, without making sure whether the Serbian and Greek armies would condescend to do likewise. Russia promised to put a stop to the fratricidal war if Bulgaria would accept the territory between the Bregalnitsa and Vardar, the Belassitsa Mountains and the Struma, with the towns of Kotshana, Radovitch Pehtsevo, Drama, Cavalla and possibly Serres, but Danev refused and resigned, declaring that „his policy had gone bankrupt". His resignation and the advent of the Austrophile Cabinet of Radoslavov brought about the failure of Russia's effort to help Bulgaria out of the mess she had got in. Tsar Ferdinand immediately suspended General Savov from his functions for having obeyed the injunctions of the Government. The Serbians who were so long spoiling for a fight, now that they had been offered an excellent justification for doing so [1] rejected all offers for

[1] The Serbian military circles had formally declared to the Serbian Government that they had definitely resolved to retain the lands they occupied and that they would not yield them up. Proclamations declaring war on Bulgaria in which the date was left blank were seized on Serbian prisoners and this shows that the Serbians were contemplating to declare war on Bulgaria and were waiting for a favourable occasion; the Bulgarians merely forestalled

an armistice, and turned a deaf ear to Russia's injunctions counterattacked the Bulgarians who had been ordered to cease fighting and badly mauled them. It took some time for the Bulgarian army to recover from these initial rebuffs, but in a few weeks under the able leadership of general R. Dimitriev, the situation had been retrieved. The Bulgarians were advancing on Nisch and threatening to cut the communications of the Serbian army in Macedonia, while the Greek army seemed as if it would suffer a Sedan in the Kresna defile but all these efforts of the troops were unavailing. The Rumanian army unrestrained by Russia, which could not allow Serbia to be crushed, had invaded Bulgaria and was advancing unopposed on Sofia, while Turkey, following the example set by Rumania, reoccupied Adrianople. Bulgaria was forced to capitulate and throw herself on the mercy of her vindictive enemies.

By the ensuing Treaty of Bucarest signed on August 10, Bulgaria was deprived of all share in Macedonia save the upper part of the valley of the river Struma, and received as her share of the spoils wrung from Turkey, a short stretch of coast line of the Aegean, between the rivers Mesta and Maritsa with its hinterland, the mountainous region of the Rhodopes. She was obliged to cede to Rumania the whole of the southern Dobrudja in spite of the fact that this region of 7609 sq. klm. with a population of 290000 souls contained only 2.2% of Rumanians One would have expected that both the Balkan States and the Great Powers would have at least exerted themselves a little in order to secure for Bulgaria that part of Thrace up

an attack on their allies. Sazonov in his „Fateful Years", p. 95, admits that it was Russia who prevented Serbia from opening hostilities: „The army was confident of success. I replied that I did not consider myself in a position to offer strategic advice, but from a political no less than a moral point of view such a policy would cause irreparable damage to Serbia, damage for which no military success could compensate her.

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648 der-in-chief and chief of the army staff, whose participation in enginering the attack on June 29, 1913 is graphically described in Minister Pechev's Memoirs. Some 30,000 Macedonians were enrolled and trained long before the publication of the mobilisation decree on the night of September 21, in order that they might be used if necessary as a bludgeon to overawe the Bulgarians into accepting the policy which had been decided on. The Macedonians had made repeated efforts to convince the Allies of the necessity of transferring their native land to Bulgaria, but disgusted at the irresoluteness the Entente displayed, they finally threw in their lot with the Germans and actively assisted the latter in putting into operation their plans. Dr. Vladov one of their leaders had approached at an early date Savinsky, the Russian ambassador in Sofia and told him:

„If only you succeed in obtaining for Bulgaria the Macedonian territories which should be hers according to the Bulgaro-Serbian agreement of 1912, the whole country will be up in arms and fight at your side. Should the Government try and oppose us, we would force them to desist: as to the King, we who have more than once faced death, would not hesitate to do away with him should he attempt to thwart our political ambitions". (Recollections of a Russian diplomat. p. 204).

648 The ministers of the Triple Entente presented an
721 ultimatum on October 4 summoning Bulgaria to break off relations with the Central Powers, to which Radoslavov replied with an indignant protest of innocence that could hardly be surpassed in duplicity; this having been considered as unsatisfactory, the Entente representatives severed diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and left on October 7. A few days later the Bulgarian army, as it had been prearranged, crossed into Serbia in order to support the Austro-German attack on that country which had already begun.[1]

[1] (For details of the military operations see the writer's contribution to „Bulgaria & Rumania." in the Nations of to-day series, published by Hodder & Stoughton).

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721 The occupation of Macedonia did not render the Radoslavov Gevernment any the more popular in the eyes of the people. The chief brunt of the fighting fell on the Bulgarians, because the Germans after reaching Kragujevats withdrew their forces and left only one army corps to support Bulgaria. This relieved to some extent the pressure on the Serbian army and enabled it to retreat through Albania to the Adriatic. Apparently von Mackensen's plan was to open up communications with Turkey and did not consist of annihilating the Serbian army which would have involved much greater sacrifices for the Germans. After completing the conquest of Macedonia, the Bulgarian army leaders insisted on occupying Salonica, so as to eliminate an eventual enemy thrust from that quarter in order that they might then proceed to the partial demobilisation of the army; to this demand, however, the Germans opposed a resolute refusal. They considered that the maintenance of the Salonica front suited best their purpose, for the Bulgarian army which could not be employed in th west, could be used to tie down a corresponding number of Entente troops which would necessarily be detached from the Western front where otherwise they would have to be faced by Germans. Radoslavov in his „Bulgaria and the world crisis", p.137/8, affirms that:

„The attack on Salonica was not undertaken because it was believed that Greece would eventually join the Central Alliance. She had already permitted the taking of Rupel, Drama, and Cavalla according to a written prearranged plan. Early in 1916 von Falkenhayn decided not to take Salonica and was supported by Hindenburg though General Conrad von Hötzendorf held the contrary view. Soon after the occupation of Serbia, serious divergences arose between Bulgaria and Austria over Prizren and Prishtina, both States demanding their incorporation into their respective territory".

724 648 Serious difficulties were created also through the Germans attempting to lay hands on all available supplies in Bulgaria and through their forcing the Bulgarian army

724 commissariat to furnish provisions far beyond those
648 necessary for the limited number of German troops on the Macedonian front. In the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet it was revealed that while the Germans had between 16,000 and 18,000 troops on the Southern front they were drawing rations for over 100,000 men. The balance above their requirements was sent to Germany. Each German soldier had the right to send 5kg of foodstuffs a week home, and for this purpose there was a perpetual stream of German soldiers arriving in Bulgaria from occupied Serbia buying up provisions and returning. This extensive draining of the resources of Bulgaria, increased through the illicit export of provisions systematically undertaken by the Ministers and their supporters, caused a serious dearth. Minister Pechev notes in his Memoirs, 22. XII. 1935:

„To Ghendovitch and other deputies was being granted a licence to export 200 truck-loads of flour. Shameful. Often the names of Ministers figure in the minutes of Cabinet sittings at which export licences have been granted, though the Ministers were not present"

These malpractices took such a scandalous form that they even impressed a former Prussian Minister of War, General Dr. Stein, who alludes to them in his „Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges", published in Leipzig in 1919. In order to protect the food supply of the troops, General Jostov, the chief of the Staff, notified von Mackensen, without consulting the Government, that no more German troops were to be sent to Macedonia owing to the difficulty of providing them with supplies. Radoslavov in his book (Op. cit. p. 139) affirms that this was a pretext, and that Jostov considered that the aim of the war having been attained, Bulgaria ought
721 to seek to conclude peace with the Entente. When Ru-
648 mania declared war against Austria-Hungary, influential circles in Bulgaria attempted to maintain Bulgaria neutral

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in the conflict. The Rumanian Minister in Sofia gave assurances that Rumania would support Bulgaria's claim to Macedonia, that she would retrocede southern Dobrudja, and that she would intervene in order that a separate peace be concluded with the Entente, and that finally, Bulgaria would secure the Midia-Enos line in Thrace. The Opposition did its best to convince Radoslavov of the expediency of this policy, it also sent delegates to Ferdinand to plead in favour of the adoption of this plan, but Ferdinand rejected them with contumely and ordered Radoslavov to declare war on Rumania which was done on September 1, 1916, four days later than Germany.

After the occupation of the Dobrudja, the Germans started requisitioning all the available supplies and this gave rise to continuous incidents between the Bulgarians and the Germans The occupation of the railway lines and the installing of German administrative authorities in certain parts of the Dobrudja which was claimed in its entirety by Bulgaria, caused a very grave conflict between the two allied governments, and strained relations almost to breaking point.

In the early spring of 1917, General Sarrail showed activity on the Salonica front and on July 2, Greece, after King Constantine's expulsion, officially declared war on Bulgaria. The Bulgarians appealed for assistance to Germany but received nothing save the advice to shorten their front by retreating. The dearth of foodstuffs and the ever-increasing pressure of the enemy on the Salonica front was rendering the situation in Bulgaria desperate. General Jekov was often in complete disagreement with the Government and refused to take orders from it. On September 20 the Agrarians sent a letter to the commander-in-chief proposing to him to overthrow the Radoslavov Government and assuring him of their willingness to continue the policy of co-operation with Germany.